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PROTECTING CONSUMER PROTECTION 
JC Lai* and SI Becher* 
Recent consumer law cases are shaping consumer law in an unwarranted way. The courts have 
acknowledged the importance of advancing consumer law and protecting consumers, however, upon 
closer examination it is questionable whether courts are employing the right framework, tools and 
considerations. By analysing recent country of origin cases this article identifies some potentially 
worrying ways in which the courts have eroded consumer law rather than strengthening it. In 
particular, such cases allow the proprietary interest of goodwill to creep into the Fair Trading Act 
1986 (FTA). Doing so, even if only at the stage of determining the penalty to be imposed, may shift 
the dial further towards the Fair Trading Act (FTA) being a means for protecting traders' interests. 
This, in turn, may lead to negative unintended consequences.    
I INTRODUCTION: THE ROAD TO UNDERMINING 
CONSUMER PROTECTION IS PAVED WITH GOOD 
INTENTIONS  
Recent years have seen a steady growth in consumer law cases concerning country of origin, New 
Zealand tourism and the New Zealand "brand".1 Since the enactment of the Fair Trading Act 1986 
(FTA), cases brought by the Commerce Commission regarding country of origin claims (particularly 
misleading or deceptive conduct with respect to being made in New Zealand) have increased steadily.2 
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1  This is in line with the focus of consumer organisations, such as the Commerce Commission, on credence 
qualities. See for example Commerce Commission "Commission's alpaca case brings total fines to $1.5 
million" (press release, 23 May 2017); Commerce Commission "Commission releases 2017/18 priorities" 
(press release, 20 July 2017) ("In our consumer area we will focus on … credence claims. … When it comes 
to credence, it is difficult for consumers to verify claims made about a product, and therefore easy for them 
to be misled. In particular, we will be paying attention to food products and country of origin claims").  
2  For a partial, illustrative list see the Appendix. It should be noted that not all decisions (especially from the 
District Court) have been published.  
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Notably, there is also an increased willingness to prosecute the directors of the liable companies. 
Commensurate with this has been a rise in the penalties imposed.  
At the time of writing, the latest of these cases was Commerce Commission v Topline International 
Ltd. In May 2017, the Auckland District Court fined Topline International Ltd ($405,000) and its 
director ($121,500) for misleading consumers under s 10 of the FTA (a total of $526,500).3 These 
figures, no doubt, reflect the courts' increasing willingness to impose high fines in consumer law 
cases.4 Significant fines are required in order to deter firms from engaging in misleading or deceptive 
behaviour. It would, hence, appear that one should not second guess judicial readiness to impose high 
fines.  
Nonetheless, we submit that Topline, together with other recent cases, moves the boundaries of 
consumer law in an unwarranted direction. Upon closer examination, it is questionable whether courts 
are employing the right framework, tools and considerations for advancing consumer law. We argue 
that courts employ problematic approaches that may actually erode consumer law, rather than 
strengthen it. By analysing recent country of origin decisions, we point to potential oversights and 
explain their unintended consequences.  
Before we delve into the matter, an important clarification is necessary. One may argue that the 
cases addressed are only District Court decisions, and that such decisions have little precedential 
value. District Courts have a heavy workload and it is assumed that they do not create or develop 
law.5 Thus, District Court decisions do not typically merit much scholarly attention. While this 
observation is important, it should not obscure the character of consumer law. Due to their nature, 
consumer law cases are predominantly brought before lower courts. Higher courts do dictate the 
development of law to be applied by the lower courts, however, in the absence of such precedent – as 
is often the case in the context of consumer law – the District Courts have an important role in 
developing consumer law. Moreover, District Courts do aspire to apply the law coherently and 
consistently.6 This is particularly true with respect to the proportionality of fines and penalties applied 
to similar behaviours.  
Against this background, we seek to advance a consistent and effective approach to deal with 
consumer law issues, which will facilitate the better development of the law. In particular, we discuss 
  
3  Commerce Commission v Topline International Ltd [2017] NZDC 9221. For a detailed discussion see Part II 
of this article. Maximum penalty amounts are detailed in s 40 of the Fair Trading Act 1986 [FTA]. 
4  An additional case from 2017 which illustrates courts' willingness to impose high fines in consumer law cases 
is Commerce Commission v Reckitt Benckiser (NZ) Ltd [2017] NZDC 1956.  
5  It is generally the role of District Courts to hear evidence, determine the facts and resolve disputes.  
6  As specifically noted in Commerce Commission v Frozen Yoghurt Ltd [2016] NZDC 19792 at [9]; and 
Commerce Commission v Wild Nature NZ Ltd DC Auckland CRI-2012-063-003511, 12 December 2014 at 
[4]. 
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how recent cases allow the proprietary interest of goodwill to creep into the FTA. We opine that doing 
so may promote the FTA being a means for protecting traders' interests, rather than focusing on 
consumers' interests.  
II PROTECTING CONSUMER PROTECTION: WHAT'S 
GOODWILL GOT TO DO WITH IT?7  
This Part starts by outlining recent country of origin cases. It focuses on how these decisions 
imported the concepts of reputation and goodwill into the FTA regime. This is followed, in Subpart 
B, by an examination of case law pertaining to s 9 of the FTA. It addresses judicial statements from 
the appellate courts regarding: (1) the absence of goodwill in the FTA and an unwillingness to go 
beyond the statutory wording; (2) the focus of the FTA on consumers and the public interest; and (3) 
judicial discretion in awarding damages under the FTA, and the relevance of the primary purpose of 
the Act and the party bringing the cause of action. Subpart C highlights the fact that s 10 of the FTA 
is arguably even more public-interest orientated than s 9. Finally, Subpart D discusses why one should 
be wary of subsuming the concepts of reputation and goodwill into the consumer law regime. 
A Setting the Scene 
We begin our analysis with Topline, where the Court addressed Topline's "NatureBee Potentiated 
Bee Pollen" product, which was labelled as being made in New Zealand.8 In fact, the bee pollen was 
sourced from China, was turned into potentiated bee pollen in China and was encapsulated in China. 
After being imported into New Zealand, it was then bottled and labelled.9 As part of this process, 
Topline used the well-known "New Zealand Made" label, with the red kiwi in a blue and red 
triangle.10 It also promoted its product by emphasising the various advantages that New Zealand made 
bee pollen has.  
The Commerce Commission brought the case under s 10 of the FTA. This section pertains to 
"conduct that is liable to mislead the public as to the nature, manufacturing process, characteristics, 
suitability for a purpose, or quantity of goods". Topline and its director pleaded guilty to all charges. 
In the decision on the penalties for the misleading conduct, the Court stated:11 
The defendants need to be held accountable for their blatantly misleading and knowingly untruthful 
promotion of their product. Deterrence must be a principal sentencing factor and consequences need to be 
  
7  Alluding to Tina Turner What's Love Got to Do with It (1993).  
8  Topline, above n 3. 
9  The leading decision for determining where something is made, with respect to the FTA and misleading and 
deceptive conduct, is Carter Holt Harvey Ltd v Cottonsoft Ltd [2004] BCL 995 (CA); and the decision below 
Carter Holt Harvey Ltd v Cottonsoft Ltd (2004) 11 TCLR 161 (HC). 
10  Trade Mark No 976133. 
11  Topline, above n 3, at [26]. 
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imposed to discourage commercially unethical behaviour. Denunciation is also required for the potential 
damage to the "MADE IN NEW ZEALAND" brand.  
Furthermore, the Judge explained:12 
This breach [of the FTA] has the potential to damage all other exporters using the "MADE IN NEW 
ZEALAND" label and also damage this country's image for its products sold overseas, resulting in 
increased scrutiny of New Zealand made products and a lack of consumer confidence in these products. 
As reflected in these statements, the Court was willing to consider the potential damage to the 
"Made in New Zealand" brand, "the potential to damage all other exporters" using the label, and the 
damage to New Zealand products' image overseas.  
Topline is not alone in this regard. For example, the 2013 case Commerce Commission v Mi 
Woollies Ltd also considered the damage to the New Zealand image and consequently, to the tourism 
industry.13 This case dealt with sheepskin footwear labelled "UGG New Zealand" and "New Zealand 
Owned & Operated". In fact, the footwear was made in China from predominantly Australian 
sheepskin. The Court noted that:14 
The New Zealand tourism industry has also been harmed by this conduct. Tourism New Zealand has 
invested heavily under the auspices of its "100% Pure" brand, and the activities of retailers who 
misrepresent that their products are New Zealand made have the potential to harm Tourism New Zealand's 
efforts to drive sustainable growth for this market. 
The Court noted that harm or future harm to the tourist industry and the Tourism New Zealand 
"100% Pure" brand had not been demonstrated.15 Nevertheless, the Court considered "potential for 
damage to the tourist trade" as an aggravating factor for sentencing.16 Relatedly, in R v Princess Wool 
Co Ltd,17 a case pertaining to the false labelling of duvets being 100 per cent alpaca wool or containing 
cashmere, the Court stated that:18 
The direct impact on other businesses was significant and I accept that there is an overall detrimental 
impact on the country as a whole as the defendant's actions contribute to an impression that [may be] 
  
12  At [31]. 
13  Commerce Commission v Mi Woollies DC Christchurch CRI-2012-009-009069, 31 July 2013. 
14  At [8]. See also Commerce Commission v Chen DC Auckland CRI-2012-004-019312, 28 March 2013 at [13]; 
and Commerce Commission v Premium Alpaca DC Rotorua CRI-2012-063-004546, 5 August 2013 at [16]; 
aff'd Premium Alpaca v Commerce Commission [2014] NZHC 1836. 
15  Mi Woollies, above n 13, at [26]. 
16  At [31]. 
17  R v Princess Wool Co Ltd [2017] NZDC 12227. 
18  At [14]. 
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gained by persons overseas that they cannot necessarily rely on what they are told by people undertaking 
business in New Zealand. 
Interestingly, this was despite the fact that the misconduct did not involve any country of origin 
issues. However, the kind of product was one that tourists tended to buy as a New Zealand souvenir. 
This misconduct, the Court believed, requires special deterrence.19 
While the terms reputation and goodwill are related, and are often used and applied 
interchangeably (including by New Zealand courts), they are technically different.20 A trader's 
reputation can be positive or negative, as it depends on the way consumers view the trader. In contrast, 
goodwill can only be positive, as it an asset and proprietary in nature, measured by how much the 
market is willing to pay for it. The courts have long accepted that goodwill can be owned by a group 
of traders.21  
Lord Macnaghten famously stated:22 
What is goodwill? It is a thing very easy to describe, very difficult to define. It is the benefit and advantage 
of a good name, reputation, and connection of business. It is the attractive force which brings in custom. 
It is the one thing which distinguishes an old established business from a new business at its first start. 
The goodwill of a business must emanate from a particular centre or source. However widely extended or 
diffused its influence may be, goodwill is worth nothing unless it has a power of attraction sufficient to 
bring customers home to the source from which it emanates. Goodwill is composed of a variety of 
elements. It differs in its composition in different trades and in different businesses in the same trade. 
Reputation, of course, feeds into goodwill. However, goodwill is a broader concept, including 
determinants such as business size. To illustrate, the better a business' reputation, the greater the 
goodwill associated with its brand. At the same time, two businesses with similar reputations might 
have different levels of goodwill, because they differ in trading size. Strictly speaking, a business can 
  
19  At [17]. 
20  In contrast to New Zealand courts, English case law has held that reputation alone is not enough to bring a 
case of passing off. There must be established goodwill, meaning trade presence in the jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, while reputation can attach to individuals, goodwill can only attach to (and is inseparable from) 
businesses. See Starbucks (HK) Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Group plc [2015] UKSC 31 at [23] and [51]–
[52]; Star Industrial Co Ltd v Yap Kwee Kor [1976] FSR 256 (PC) at 259; and Bhayani v Taylor Bracewell 
LLP [2016] EWHC 3360 (Ch) at [26]–[28]. 
21  See for example Erven Warnink BV v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd [1979] AC 731 (HL); and Wineworths 
Group Ltd v Comite Interprofessionel du Vin de Champagne [1992] 2 NZLR 327 (CA). 
22  Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Muller & Co's Margarine Ltd [1901] AC 217 (HL) at 223–224 (emphasis 
added). 
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only have goodwill in a jurisdiction if it trades within it, though it might have some reputation in that 
jurisdiction.23 
Though the cases discussed above did not use the word "goodwill", the judges were in essence 
referring to the "attractive force which brings in custom" to particular businesses that trade in New 
Zealand; that is, goodwill. Considering damage to goodwill is common and valid in deciding tort and 
property cases. However, Topline, Mi Woollies and Princess Wool were plainly consumer law cases 
brought by the Commerce Commission or the Crown. This, in turn, raises an interesting issue that the 
Court did not explicitly consider: should courts incorporate tort and property law concepts and 
principles into consumer protection law? More specifically, should goodwill be taken into account in 
sentencing decisions made under the FTA?  
B Section 9 of the Fair Trading Act 
The common law tort of passing off and s 9 of the FTA (and indeed torts and consumer law more 
broadly) have a shared history and continue to have overlapping scope. At their cores, passing off and 
ss 9–12 (misleading and deceptive conduct) and s 13 (unsubstantiated representations) of the FTA are 
about some kind of misrepresentation.24 In passing off, this is a misrepresentation as to source25 or 
association with a traditional group of manufacturers.26 At the same time, s 9 of the FTA pertains to 
conduct that is (or is likely to be) misleading or deceptive. It is common to see the two argued 
simultaneously and similarly, and – when that is done – they typically either succeed or fail together.27 
  
23  At 235 per Lord Lindley, stating that goodwill "is inseparable from the business to which it adds value, and, 
in my opinion, exists where the business is carried on". Notably, New Zealand courts have not taken such a 
strict approach: see Dominion Rent A Car Ltd v Budget Rent A Car Systems (1970) Ltd [1987] 2 NZLR 395 
(CA); Cyclone Hardware Pty Ltd v Patience & Nicholson (NZ) Ltd [2001] 3 NZLR 490 (CA); Gallaher Ltd 
v International Brands Ltd (1976) 1 NZIPR 43 (SC); Esanda Ltd v Esanda Finance Ltd [1984] 2 NZLR 748 
(HC); and Crusader Oil NL v Crusader Minerals New Zealand Ltd (1984) 1 TCLR 211 (HC). 
24  See for example Levi Strauss & Co v Kimbyr Investments Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 332 (HC) at 381, stating that 
"[a]s with passing off, the essence of this cause of action [under s 9 of the FTA] is some misrepresentation by 
the defendant". 
25  Reckitt & Colman v Borden Inc [1990] 13 RPC 341 (HL). 
26  Erven Warnink BV v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd, above n 21. Note that the test for passing off set out in 
this case differs from that set out in Reckitt & Colman v Borden Inc, above n 25. However, both require the 
essential elements: that the plaintiff had established reputation or goodwill; the defendant made a 
misrepresentation (in trade, to the public or to consumers); which caused (or will cause) damage to goodwill, 
or loss of sales. The New Zealand courts use both tests, sometimes mixing them, depending on the facts at 
hand.  
27  See for example Champagne, above n 21, at 333–334 per Cooke P and at 344–345 per Gault J. This is, 
however, not always the case: see Prudential Building & Investment Society of Canterbury v Prudential 
Assurance Co of NZ Ltd [1988] 2 NZLR 653 (CA) [Prudential v Prudential] at 659 per Bisson J, where the 
Court explained the differences between the tort and s 9 of the FTA and found the latter to be more fitting. 
See also ABB Ltd v New Zealand Insulators Ltd (2006) 3 NZCCLR 645 (HC). 
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The fact that s 9 – unlike some other sections of the FTA – can only result in civil liability,28 points 
to another important similarity.  
Nonetheless, there are also important differences between passing off and the FTA. First and 
foremost, the FTA and passing off have different (albeit sometimes overlapping) purposes. In 2013, 
a "Purpose" section was added to the FTA. This confirmed the broad purposes of the Act, which 
include protecting consumer interests,29 contributing to effective competition and promoting 
confidence in markets.30 The FTA, thus, prohibits "unfair conduct and practices in relation to trade", 
"promotes fair conduct" and mandates "disclosure of consumer information".31 Modern passing off, 
however, protects the goodwill or reputation associated with "get-up" or a group of traders, as a 
proprietary right.32  
For a successful claim of passing off, goodwill or reputation needs to be proven as a matter of 
fact. In contrast, the FTA makes no allusion to goodwill or reputation, though it may on occasion also 
protect it. The "public interest" is what matters under the FTA.33 Justice Fisher reiterated this 
distinction in Tot Toys Ltd v Mitchell, stating:34  
It is enough for the plaintiff to point to misleading or deceptive conduct by the defendant – whether or not 
this has caused injury to the plaintiff. Indeed, it would not even seem necessary for the plaintiff to establish 
that there is market confusion between the defendant and some other existing competitor. To misrepresent 
that a painting was painted by Goldie would contravene the Act even though there is no current painter of 
Goldies. The principal object of the Act is to protect the public, not to vindicate the rights of a competitor. 
Secondly, one can only bring an action for passing off if one is the victim of that tort. In contrast, 
"any person" can apply to the courts for civil law remedies for a breach of ss 9–12 and 13 of the FTA. 
  
28  See FTA, s 40(1).  
29  Section 1A(1)(a) inserted, on 18 December 2013, by s 5 of the Fair Trading Amendment Act 2013. 
30  Section 1A(1)(b)–(c). 
31  Section 1A(2). 
32  Spalding v Gamage (1915) 32 RPC 273 (HL); and Star Industrial Co, above n 20. 
33  Taylor Bros Ltd v Taylors Group Ltd [1990] 1 NZLR 19 (CA) [Taylor v Taylor] at 25 per Cooke P.  
34  Tot Toys Ltd v Mitchell [1993] 1 NZLR 325 at 368 per Fisher J (emphasis added). 
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This includes the Commerce Commission, consumers and competitors.35 As noted above, criminal 
sanctions are not available for s 9, but are for ss 10–12 and 13.36 
Lastly, contravention of ss 9–12 and 13 of the FTA does not require any kind of damage.37 In 
contrast, for passing off, there needs to be damage. This can be in the form of lost sales via "diversion 
of trade",38 or damage to the plaintiff's goodwill.39 The Court of Appeal has specifically noted this 
difference with respect to s 9, adding that the "ordinary words of s 9 are to be applied to the particular 
facts and are not to be superseded by judicial exegesis".40  
Of course, if the plaintiff can show goodwill or reputation, this could support his or her case for 
misleading or deceptive conduct.41 Furthermore, just because one need not show damage to goodwill 
to bring an action under s 9 is not to say that such damage is not potentially relevant for assessing the 
penalty for breach of s 9. When the plaintiff is the owner of the goodwill, damage to goodwill might 
be relevant when assessing civil liability damages. Under s 43(3)(f) of the FTA, a person who suffers 
loss or damage as a result of unfair conduct per ss 9–12 and 13 can get tort-like damages.42 It is at the 
court's discretion to order payment for damage or loss caused,43 and whether the award will be for the 
  
35  FTA, ss 41 and 43. See also Debra Wilson "Consumer Information" in Kate Tokely (ed) Consumer Law in 
New Zealand (2nd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2014) 125 at 129 ("The remedies section, s 43, awards 
standing to 'any person' to seek a remedy"). See also Taylor v Taylor, above n 33, at 40, where Cooke P 
affirmed and discussed the fact that the FTA could be used by one trader against another. His Honour, 
furthermore, refused to add a "gloss" to s 9 by requiring some kind of impact on consumers. 
36  FTA, 40(1). 
37  Tot Toys Ltd v Mitchell, above n 34, at 367–368 per Fisher J. 
38  See for example Reckitt & Colman v Borden Inc, above n 25. 
39  See for example Erven Warnink BV v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd, above n 21; Spalding v Gamage, above 
n 32; and Champagne, above n 21. Note, however, the more recent English case law that has held that 
reputation alone cannot form the basis for an action of passing off: above n 20. 
40  Champagne, above n 21, at 333 per Cooke P (emphasis added). See also Prudential v Prudential, above n 27, 
at 658 per Bisson J; and Trust Bank Auckland Ltd v ASB Bank Ltd [1989] 3 NZLR 385 (CA) at 388 per Cooke 
J. 
41  Tot Toys Ltd v Mitchell, above n 34, at 367 per Fisher J. 
42  In support of the damages awarded under FTA, s 43, being tort-like rather than contract-law like, see David 
W McLauchlan "Damages for Misrepresentation Under the Fair Trading Act: Expectation or Reliance?" 
(1999) 5 NZBLQ 133; and David McLauchlan "Damages for Misrepresentation Under the Fair Trading Act: 
The Aftermath of Cox v Coxon" (2002) 8 NZBLQ 14. 
43  Tot Toys Ltd v Mitchell, above n 34, at 368 per Fisher J. On this discretion, see Jude Antony "Heaven, Red 
Eagle, and the Importance of Judicial Discretion in the Award of Damages under the Fair Trading Act" (2014) 
20 NZBLQ 3. 
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full amount of damage or loss.44 In comparison, if the plaintiff of a passing off action proves the cause 
of action, damages must be awarded to compensate for the entirety of the damage. 
Under the FTA, the person who suffers the damage need not be the person who brings the 
application or be part of the proceedings for the court to grant such damages.45 Interestingly, the 
Federal Court of Australia has awarded damages for harm to goodwill or reputation resulting from a 
breach of the Australian equivalent of s 9 of the FTA on several occasions.46 However, each of these 
cases involved competitors.  
In contrast, in Topline, Mi Woollies and Princess Wool, it was the Commerce Commission or the 
Crown that initiated litigation. The courts considered goodwill to assess the penalty, but not the 
alleged breach. This results in a strange discord between the punishment and the behaviour. It is also 
not the owners of the goodwill that receive compensation. 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal has noted that the differences between the action of passing off 
and s 9 of the FTA mean that the availability of remedies is consequently different.47 Because the 
principal object of the FTA is to protect the consumer:48  
In deciding whether a statutory remedy should be granted, the most important question is therefore 
whether the misleading or deceptive conduct is likely to have a sufficiently serious impact upon customers 
rather than trade competitors. 
  
44  See for example Goldsbro v Walker [1993] 1 NZLR 394 (CA) at 399 per Cooke P. 
45  FTA, s 43(2)(b). 
46  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 52; Typing Centre of NSW Pty Ltd v Northern Business College Ltd [1989] 
FCA 115 at [39]–[41]; Raia Insurance Brokers Ltd v Fai General Insurance Co Ltd [1993] FCA 92 at [64]–
[66]; and Acohs Pty Ltd v RA Bashford Consulting Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 352.  
Note that Ursula Cheer and John Burrows cite Hay v Chalmers (1991) 3 NZBLC 102,000 (HC) for the 
proposition that s 9 of the FTA can be used as an alternative to the tort of defamation (which protects 
reputation): see "Defamation" in Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (7th ed, Thomson 
Reuters, Wellington, 2016) 839 at 969. In Hay v Chalmers the defendant was in debt and, in order to stall for 
time, told his suppliers and creditors that this was a result of his accountant (the plaintiff) having 
misappropriated $9,000–$12,000 from him. The plaintiff's reputation was harmed, causing him to lose 
business. The plaintiff brought five causes of action under defamation and one under s 9 of the FTA. Damages 
for the latter were only awarded for loss of business. Hay v Chalmers is, thus, not precedent for damages 
being awarded for harm to reputation or goodwill under the FTA. 
47  Prudential v Prudential, above n 27, at 658–659 per Bisson J. 
48  Tot Toys Ltd v Mitchell, above n 34, at 368 per Fisher J. At 371 his Honour stated "[t]he dominant 
consideration under this statute is the effect upon consumers." 
268 (2018) 49 VUWLR 
The Supreme Court has specifically stated that, whether or not an order should be made under the 
FTA for the defendant to pay for any damage caused depends on a range of factors including:49  
… whether there is a claimant alleging an injurious consequence already suffered, whether the claimant 
instead fears future loss for itself or others, or whether the claim is brought by the Commerce Commission 
or another party which is acting in the interests of those who may be affected by the defendant's conduct. 
Overall, the appellate courts have clearly stated that the primary purpose of the FTA is the 
protection of consumers and the public interest. They have also refused to go beyond the statutory 
wording of the FTA, declining to introduce a requirement that there was goodwill or damage thereto. 
The appellate courts have stated that any statutory remedy needs to be determined relative to the Act's 
primary purpose of protecting consumers. The discretion to award damages is dependent on whether 
it is a competitor or the Commerce Commission that brings the case. As discussed further below, 
these arguments are stronger in relation to s 10 of the FTA. 
C Section 10 of the Fair Trading Act 
Section 10 of the FTA is arguably even more concerned with the public than s 9. Like s 9, s 10 
makes no reference to reputation or goodwill. Nor does s 10 require that the conduct causes damage 
of any kind. However, while s 9 imposes only civil remedies, s 10 also results in criminal liability, 
suggesting that it exists to protect the public or is about a wrong against society. Further, s 10 
specifically refers to "the public" as the subject of the misleading or deceptive behaviour. Taking these 
points together, it is clear that s 10 is aimed at protecting the public interest, making business 
reputation and goodwill even more irrelevant in comparison to s 9.  
In Topline, however, the Court was concerned with the damage to the "Made in New Zealand" 
brand and consequently to other traders' reputations.50 Analogously, in Mi Woollies the Court took 
into account the harm to the "100% Pure" brand and tourism in New Zealand. This is despite the fact 
that the Commerce Commission brought the cases, the courts were considering criminal penalties, not 
civil liability, and no specific traders were involved or claimed for personal damages.51 Indeed, in 
Commerce Commission v Budge Collection Ltd, another alpaca case,52 the Court noted that "[i]it is 
  
49  Red Eagle Corp Ltd v Ellis [2010] NZSC 20, [2010] 2 NZLR 492 at [26]. 
50  Section 16 of the FTA protects registered trademarks from forgery and false use that is misleading or 
deceptive. This section, however, was not at issue. We thank Susan Corbett for pointing out this oft-forgotten 
section. 
51  In Princess Wool, above n 17, a competing company submitted a victim impact report showing financial harm 
due to unfair competition caused by the defendants' behaviour, but was not compensated for such. 
52  The Commerce Commission appears to be targeting misleading behaviour with respect to alpaca products in 
the tourist market: see Commerce Commission "Summary of Penalties in Alpaca Related Prosecutions" (23 
May 2017) <www.comcom.govt.nz>. Most, but not all of these, were country of origin cases. Otherwise, the 
conduct at issue was mislabelling merino or cashmere content. 
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too difficult to identify or quantify any reputation damage to New Zealand as a tourist destination for 
that to affect sentencing."53  
One could perhaps argue that, rather than being about other traders, the protection of the goodwill 
in the New Zealand brand can be equated with protecting a public good. Harm to that public good 
might warrant criminal penalties. This is not, however, how the courts have framed the matter. 
At least insofar as the appropriate penalty is concerned, it would seem that decisions such as 
Topline and Mi Woollies added a "gloss" to the FTA,54 reflecting "judicial exegesis". In other words, 
the decisions seem to blur important and fundamental distinctions, without explicitly discussing the 
matter. 
D The Issues 
The common law and the interpretation of statutory law influencing one another is not something 
new.55 Nor is the challenge of drawing a clear line between consumer protection and business 
protection.56 Yet, there is cause for concern in our context from various perspectives.  
Methodologically, the tort of passing off protects goodwill in the trade context as property. It thus 
affords protection to the owner of the goodwill. In contrast, the primary purpose of the FTA is 
consumer protection.57 Even when competitors bring FTA claims, they do not argue that they have 
  
53  Commerce Commission v Budge Collection Ltd [2016] NZDC 15542 at [29]. 
54  The Court of Appeal has specifically refused to add "glosses" to the FTA: see Taylor v Taylor, above n 33, at 
40 per Cooke P; Trust Bank Auckland Ltd v ASB Bank Ltd, above n 40, at 398 per Cooke P; and Levi Strauss 
& Co v Kimbyr Investments Ltd, above n 24, at 382. 
55  See also Taylor v Taylor, above n 33, at 40 per Cooke P. 
56  See for example Taylor v Taylor, above n 33; and Levi Strauss & Co v Kimbyr Investments Ltd, above n 24. 
57  The Court of Appeal has been clear that consumer protection is the primary purpose of the FTA. See for 
example Taylor v Taylor, above n 33, at 39 per Cooke P, stating that the FTA "is primarily consumer-
protection legislation". See also Levis Strauss & Co v Kimbyr Investments Ltd, above n 24, at 382, stating: 
"The courts have emphasised the importance of the Act in protecting the consumer"; and Commerce 
Commission v Anwer [2016] NZDC 25266 at [5] per Field J, stating: "The Fair Trading Act is designed to 
facilitate consumer welfare and effective competition. It is consumer focused and gives force to the notion 
that traders, who conduct business fairly and lawfully, should not be disadvantaged by those who do not."  
Indeed, disturbed by the lack of an explicit reference to consumers in s 9, in Neumegen v Neumegen & Co 
[1998] 3 NZLR 310 (CA) at 323–324, Thomas J (in a strong dissent) stated that: "Where there is nothing 
adverse or unfair to the relevant group of consumers, the Courts should hesitate before intervening under s 9 
to protect one trader from another. Rival traders may bring proceedings under s 9, but that does not mean that  
a rival trader should be able to obtain the benefit of a statutory provision designed for consumers and thereby 
to stifle legitimate competition." 
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been personally aggrieved to prove the cause of action.58 Irrespective of the plaintiff's identity, the 
FTA operates to protect consumers from misleading or deceptive conduct in trade. We should, hence, 
be rather cautious with respect to the incorporation of goodwill or damage principles in the FTA 
context. This is true when considering contravention of the Act (regardless of the identity of the 
plaintiff) as well as the fine or penalty for such (if the plaintiff is not the owner of the goodwill). This 
is especially alarming when done implicitly, with no straightforward and proper discussion.  
However, our concerns go beyond analytical and methodological clarity and precision. More 
generally, the incorporation of goodwill and other tort or property principles into consumer law may 
dilute consumer law and thereby weaken it. The FTA is undoubtedly central to New Zealand's 
consumer law, and its importance can hardly be overstated.59 By targeting unfair and misleading 
conduct and providing for consumer information, the Act seeks to level the consumer-trader "playing 
field". Much of the Act's significance lies in the fact that it aspires to regulate consumer markets ex 
ante. The Act's importance is further illustrated by the Commerce Commission's 2016–2017 report.60 
According to this report, the Commerce Commission received 7,270 consumer complaints for the 
year from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017. Of these, 6,798 (approximately 94 per cent) were concerned 
with the FTA.  
Introducing tort or property concepts into consumer law cases may undermine the strength and 
cohesiveness of consumer law. It might be interpreted as signalling that consumer law is a weak body 
of law. That is, that consumer law needs the aid of other fields of law in order to fulfil its main 
objective – protecting consumers. This, we believe, is not the case.  
Accordingly, the Court in Topline, Mi Woollies and Princess Wool need not have focused on the 
potential damage to the New Zealand brand. Nor should the court be concerned with the potential to 
damage all other exporters trading on this brand. Instead, courts should explain why and how these 
kinds of potential damage harm consumers. These cases were, after all, brought by the Commerce 
Commission and the Crown for the public interest. 
Indeed, under the FTA's framework there are various consumer protection explanations that the 
courts could use and connect in deciding similar cases. First, such misleading behaviour reduces 
  
58  Specifically affected persons can get damages: FTA, s 43(3)(f). A person who is found to have engaged in 
misleading or deceptive conduct per ss 9–12 can be ordered to pay a person who suffers damage as a result 
of this conduct. 
59  Some might argue that the FTA does not have the primary function of consumer protection because this was 
not stipulated in the Act's long title when it was first enacted: see for example Andrea Bather and Jagdeep 
Singh Ladhar "Fair Trading" in Richard J Varey (ed) New Zealand Law for Marketers (2d ed, LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2014) 291 at 291. When a purpose section was added in 2013, consumer protection was listed as 
one purpose among three (albeit listed first): FTA, s 1A. However, see above n 58. 
60  For the full consumer issue report see Commerce Commission "Consumer issues report" (13 September 2017) 
<www.comcom.govt.nz>. 
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consumers' ability to make informed decisions, which are based on the information that traders 
provide. This was acknowledged in Topline and numerous other decisions.61 Second, this misleading 
behaviour undermines consumers' trust and confidence, which is a protected value in and of itself. 
The courts acknowledge this problem,62 yet it could receive more attention and weight.  
This is further illuminated by reference to an analogous, but non-country of origin, decision, 
Commerce Commission v Anwer.63 In this case, the defendant made false statements that all the used 
cars at the dealership were AA appraised. This was a "complete departure from the truth".64 In 
sentencing, Judge Field gave particular weight to the fact that "AA is a highly respected 
organisation".65 His Honour further noted that "[t]he importance of the untrue statement of course 
cannot be underestimated",66 and that the defendants' behaviour involved a "significant degree of 
recklessness".67 Of particular note, Judge Field did not discuss AA's reputation or the reputation of 
other traders who correctly state that their cars are "AA appraised".  
In addition to these two rationales, there are further justifications that courts may use in such 
cases. A third explanation is that false, misleading or deceptive statements can result in increased 
transaction costs. The undermining of consumers' trust may result in consumers having to undertake 
additional precautions before participating in this (and similar) markets. Fourth, this may result in a 
more rigorously regulated market. Put another way, it may lead to higher or stricter standards 
employed in relation to traders' statements. While this may reduce the risk of consumers being 
deceived, it also imposes higher costs on vendors. These costs, at least in part, are likely to be passed 
on to consumers. Fifth, if a market is characterised by a lack of confidence, a high degree of regulation 
and increased transaction costs, potential traders might be deterred from participating in this market. 
This decreases competition. Competitive markets result in better products and lower prices, and are 
thus believed to serve the "long-term benefit of consumers".68  
Overall, it is possible for the courts to provide a coherent set of consumer protection rationales to 
make it clear that decisions like Topline, Mi Woollies and Princess Wool are centred on consumer 
  
61  Topline, above n 3, at [27]; and, for example, Wild Nature, above n 6, at [3]. 
62  See for example Budge Collection, above n 53, at [20] and [29].  
63  Commerce Commission v Anwer, above n 57. 
64  At [7]. 
65  At [6]. 
66  At [6]. 
67  At [7]. 
68  Commerce Act 1986, s 1A inserted, on 26 May 2001, by s 4 of the Commerce Amendment Act 2001. See 
also Tru Tone v Festival Records Retailing Marketing Ltd [1988] 2 NZLR 352 (CA) at 358 per Richardson J; 
and Lindsay Hampton and Paul G Scott Guide to Competition Law (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2013) at 2–6. 
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protection. It would also have denoted that consumer law sufficiently equips courts with the tools and 
principles for properly analysing such cases. This renders the use of other, non-consumer law 
principles redundant and perhaps inappropriate.  
III CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Policymakers seek to balance protecting consumers' interests on one hand and refraining from 
excessively intervening and regulating markets on the other. The purposes of the FTA reflect this 
challenge. It encompasses the protection of consumers' interest while also aspiring to promote 
competition, trust and confidence.  
Decisions such as Topline, Mi Woollies and Princess Wool may portend things to come. On the 
one hand, there is a general trend to undervalue and under-develop consumer law. On the other hand, 
there is a general move toward propertisation; that is, to view anything with commercial value as 
constituting property.69 These decisions allow the proprietary interest of goodwill to creep into the 
FTA when there is no property owner involved. Doing so, even if only at the stage of determining the 
penalty to be imposed, may push the FTA further towards being a means for protecting traders' 
interests.  
The Commerce Commission's protection and enforcement of consumer law is, and should stay, 
predominantly about consumer protection. Courts should not alter the role of a piece of legislation 
created mainly to protect consumers. In Topline, Mi Woollies and Princess Wool the Court had no 
compelling reason to introduce principles associated with goodwill. We are not saying that the misuse 
of brands and reputations is irrelevant with respect to consumer protection. Rather, the Court could 
have based its decisions on the desirability that consumers be able to rely on signs used in trade. As 
detailed above, there are sufficient consumer law values and rationales that could have served such a 
judicial approach. Addressing the matter from the perspective of communicative agency,70 rather than 
  
69  This is in a range of contexts. See for example Cooper v Attorney-General [1996] 3 NZLR 480 (HC) 
(regarding fishing quotas); Westco Lagan v Attorney-General [2001] 1 NZLR 40 (HC) at 54 per McGechan 
J ("contractual rights are intangible property"); Dixon v R [2015] NZSC 147 (holding that digital files were 
property for the purposes of s 249 of the Crimes Act 1961); Emily Hudson "Phillips v Mulcaire [2012]: A 
Property Paradox?" in Simon Douglas and others (eds) Landmark Cases in Property Law (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2015) 75 at 94–95; Neil Netanel Copyright's Paradox (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) at 56; 
Muireann Quigley "Propertisation and Commercialisation: On Controlling the Uses of Human Biomaterials" 
(2014) 77 MLR 677; Lionel Bently "From Communication to Thing: Historical Aspects of the 
Conceptualisation of Trade Marks as Property" in Graeme B Dinwoodie and Mark D Janis (eds) Trademark 
Law and Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary Research (Edward Elgar Publishers, Cheltenham, 2008) 3; 
and Christoph B Graber and JC Lai "Intellectual Property: Law in Context" in International Encyclopedia of 
the Social & Behavioral Sciences (2nd ed, Elsevier, New York, 2015) 266 at 267–268. Compare Justin 
Hughes "Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy, Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson" 
(2006) 79 S Cal Rev 993. 
70  On communicative agency, brands and trademarks, see Alain Pottage "No (more) Logo: Plain Packaging and 
Communicative Agency" (2013) 47 UC Davis L Rev 515. 
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property, would have placed the focus on consumers as the subjects of consumer law, especially vis-
à-vis the FTA. 
Consumer law focuses on prohibiting unfair behaviour and promoting fair conduct and practices. 
Easier said than done. As illustrated in this article, there is often more to consumer law cases than 
initially meets the eye. As markets become more complex and multi-dimensional, the need to develop 
consumer law and bring (and keep) it up-to-speed becomes increasingly important.  
However challenging, consumer law does not need the aid of other fields of law in order to protect 
consumers. It already provides courts with the necessary framework and tools to achieve this essential 
goal. We hope that this article will contribute to a consistent, holistic and careful use of these tools. 
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APPENDIX: "NEW ZEALAND" COUNTRY OF ORIGIN CASES 
UNDER THE FAIR TRADING ACT 
Year Case Name Conduct and Outcome 
1988 Farmers Trading Co Ltd v 
Commerce Commission71 
Goods labelled "Made in NZ" when they were made in 
China.  
 Charged under FTA, s13(j) – convicted. 
 Penalty: $26,000.  
 Conviction upheld on appeal to the High Court. 
1990 Commerce Commission v 
Parrs (New Zealand) 
Souvenirs Ltd72 
Defendant placed "New Zealand" sticker over "made in 
Taiwan" on 100 "sheep noise" souvenirs. 
 Charged under FTA, ss10(1) and s13(j). 
 Held: Dismissed. 
1990 Marcol Manufacturers Ltd v 
Commerce Commission73 
Leather jackets made in Korea represented as being made 
in Christchurch. Upon import they had a "Made in Korea" 
label, which was removed and replaced with "Marcol 
Christchurch New Zealand" or "Marcol Christchurch".  
 Charged under FTA, s13(j) – convicted. 
 Conviction upheld on appeal to the High Court. 
2004 Commerce Commission v 
Brownlie Brothers Ltd74  
Misleading consumers into believing that "Simply 
Squeezed" and "Supreme Orange Juice" only comprised 
squeezed New Zealand and/or Australian orange juice, 
when a proportion of the juice was concentrate imported 
from Brazil. 
 Two charges under FTA, s 10 – convicted. 
 Penalty: $35,000.  
  
  
71  Farmers Trading Co Ltd v Commerce Commission (1988) 3 TCLR 370 (HC). 
72  Commerce Commission v Parrs (New Zealand) Souvenirs Ltd (1990) 3 TCLR 431 (DC). 
73  Marcol Manufacturers Ltd v Commerce Commission [1991] 2 NZLR 502 (HC). 
74  Commerce Commission v Brownlie Brothers Ltd [2005] DCR 219. 
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2007 Commerce Commission v 
Knight Business Furniture 
Ltd75 
Office chairs built in New Zealand using components 
manufactured in Taiwan, China and Italy; components 
built to defendant's specifications. Chairs were advertised 
as "NZ Made" with a brochure including a silver fern. 
Held to be "NZ built" but not "NZ made".  
 Four charges under FTA, s 10 – dismissed. 
 Four charges under FTA, s 13(j) – convicted. 
 Penalty: $5000. 
2010 Commerce Commission v 
Prokiwi International Ltd76 
Packaging soap and skincare products with New Zealand 
symbols and "New Zealand" in a manner similar to the 
"Buy New Zealand Made" campaign. Goods were made 
from Chinese or Asian ingredients and imported into 
New Zealand. 
 17 charges under FTA, s 10 – convicted. 
 Penalty: $48,000. 
2012 Commerce Commission v Mi 
Woollies Ltd77 
Footwear labelled "UGG New Zealand" and "New 
Zealand Owned & Operated", when they were made in 
China and made predominantly from Australian 
sheepskin. This lasted from February 2011 to September 
2011. 
 Five charges under FTA, s 10 – convicted. 
 Five charges under FTA, s 13(j) – convicted. 
 Penalty: $63,000. 
2012 Commerce Commission v 
Wild Nature NZ Ltd78 
Sold "New Zealand made" alpaca rugs that were from 
Peru, and duvets labelled as containing exclusively or 
predominantly alpaca or merino wool fibre, when the 
alpaca fibres were only a small part of the duvet mix and 
the merino duvets had no merino. 
 Company – 37 charges under the FTA – convicted. 
 Director – 30 charges under the FTA – convicted. 
 Company penalty:  $243,444.  
 Director penalty:  $25,000.  
 Total penalty: $268,444 
  
75  Commerce Commission v Knight Business Furniture Ltd DC New Plymouth CRN 06043500833, 14 
September 2007 and 21 November 2007. 
76  Commerce Commission v Prokiwi International Ltd DC Christchurch CRI-2010-009-009397, 9 August 2010. 
77  Mi Woollies, above n 13. 
78  Wild Nature, above n 6. 
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2013 Commerce Commission v 
Chen79 
Top Sky Holdings labelled alpaca rugs as being made in 
New Zealand when in fact they were imported from Peru. 
Top Sky Holdings and Kiwi Wool labelled duvets as 
being predominantly containing alpaca fibres, when they 
did not, or containing merino wool when they did not. 
This occurred over a 20-month period and the defendants 
made millions of dollars. 
 Top Sky Holdings: 10 charges under the FTA, s 10; 
and two charges under the FTA, s 13(j) – 
convicted. 
 Haidong Chen (Director of Top Sky Holdings): 10 
charges under the FTA, s 10 – convicted. 
 Kiwi Wool Ltd: 18 charges under the FTA, s 13(j) 
– convicted. 
 Jinming Chen (Director of Kiwi Wool): 18 charges 
under the FTA, s 13(j) – convicted. 
 Haidong Chen (Shareholder of Kiwi Wool): 18 
charges under the FTA, s 13(j) – convicted. 
 Penalties: 
Top Sky Holdings $140,000  
Haidong Chen (Director of Top Sky 
Holdings and Shareholder of Kiwi 
Wool) 
$24,500  
Kiwi Wool Ltd $ 84,000  
Jinming Chen (Director of Kiwi Wool) $10,500  
 Total penalty: $259,000 
2014 Premium Alpaca Ltd v 
Commerce Commission80 
Alpaca rugs labelled and sold as being made in New 
Zealand when in fact they were imported from Peru. 
False claims by two of the companies were also made 
about duvets being 100 per cent alpaca or merino wool or 
southdown, when they were not. This occurred over a 20-
month period and the defendants made millions of 
dollars. 
 190 representative charges made under FTA, ss 10 
and 13(j) – convicted. 
 Penalties:  
  
79  Chen, above n 14. 
80  Premium Alpaca, above n 14. 
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Hyeon Company Ltd (importer) $105,000  
Duvet 2000 Ltd (retailer) $200,000  
Han Young Chae (Director of Hyeon 
and Duvet 2000)   
$ 24,500  
JM Wool Ltd  (retailer) $182,000  
Jong Myung Lee (Director of JM Wool 
Ltd)   
$ 21,000  
Premium Alpaca New Zealand Ltd 
(importer) 
$ 56,000  
Yun Duk Jung (Director of Premium 
Alpaca New Zealand Ltd) 
$ 6,700  
Bo Sun Yoo (Director of Premium 
Alpaca New Zealand Ltd) 
$ 6,700 
 Total penalty: $601,900. 
 Conviction upheld on appeal to the High Court. 
2014 Commerce Commission v 
BGV International Ltd81  
 
Defendant sold alpaca rugs from Peru as New Zealand 
made (between January 2010 and August 2011). 
 10 charges under FTA, s 10 – convicted. 
 Penalty: $22,000. 
2016 Commerce Commission v 
Hou82 
Packaged, labelled and sold duvets as "alpaca" and "made 
in New Zealand" when there was either no or little alpaca 
content and the duvets were made in China. This lasted 
from January 2014 to September 2014. 
 Company: 4 + 1 + 2 = six charges under FTA, s 
13(a); and three charges under FTA, s13(j) (six 
under old limit and four under new limit) – 
convicted. 
 Company Penalty: $63,000 + $28,000 = $91,000. 
 Director: one charge under FTA, s 13(a); and three 
charges under FTA s13(j) (two under old limit and 
two under new limit) – convicted. 
 Director penalty: $5600+$12,600 = $18,200. 
 Total penalty: $109,200. 
  
81  Commerce Commission v BGV International Ltd DC Auckland CRI-2012-004-017226, 23 October 2014. 
82  Commerce Commission v Hou [2016] NZDC 9291. 
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2016 Commerce Commission v 
Budge Collection Ltd83 
Imported duvets from China and repacked them as "made 
in New Zealand" and "alpaca" when neither was true. 
Around five and a half month's offending pre-increase 
and nine and a half months' offending post-increase.  
 Company: four charges under FTA, s 13(a) – 
convicted. 
 Company penalty: $63,000 + $28,000 = $57,000. 
 Director: four charges under FTA, s 13(a) – 
convicted. 
 Director penalty: $5600 + $12,600 = $14,250. 
 Total penalty: $71,250. 
2016 Commerce Commission v 
New Zealand Nutritionals 
(2004) Ltd84 
Goats' milk tablets (from January 2008 to September 
2013) and goats' milk powder (from August 2012 to 
October 2012) were labelled as "New Zealand made". 
The powder was also labelled "100% NZ made & proud 
of it". The goat's milk powder was sourced from Spain 
and the Netherlands.  
 Charged under FTA, ss 9, 10 and 13(j). 
 Declaration of contravention. 
2017 Commerce Commission v 
Topline International Ltd85  
"NatureBee Potentiated Bee Pollen" product was labelled 
as being made in New Zealand. The bee pollen was 
sourced from China, was turned into potentiated bee 
pollen in China and was encapsulated in China. After 
being imported into New Zealand, it was bottled and 
labelled. As part of this process, Topline used the well-
known "New Zealand Made" label, with the red kiwi in a 
blue and red triangle. 
 Company: 22 charges under FTA, s 10 [12 under 
old limit and 10 under new limit] – convicted. 
 Company penalty: $105,000 + $300,000 = 
$405,000. 
 Director: 22 charges under FTA, s 10 [12 under old 
limit and 10 under new limit] – convicted. 
 Director penalty: $41,500 + $80,00 = $121,500. 
 Total penalty: $526,500. 
 
  
83  Budge Collection, above n 53. 
84  Commerce Commission v New Zealand Nutritionals (2004) Ltd [2016] NZHC 832. 
85  Topline, above n 3. 
